The Italian Sea Group is not simply changing its chief executive.
The resignation of chairman and CEO Giovanni Costantino, followed by his son Gianmaria Costantino and director Pietro Smeriglio, triggered the termination of the yacht builder’s entire board under its articles of association and Italian corporate law. The outgoing directors remain in office temporarily to preserve continuity until shareholders appoint a replacement board.
That distinction matters. The group has not ceased trading, its shipyards have not closed and it has not been declared bankrupt. It is, however, operating inside a court-supervised restructuring process while attempting to preserve unfinished yachts, renegotiate loss-making contracts, stabilise relations with suppliers and secure additional capital.
For yacht owners, brokers and suppliers, the central question is no longer merely who will replace Costantino. It is whether a new board can protect the value of the group’s brands—particularly Admiral and Perini Navi—while turning a substantial order book from a source of financial pressure back into a viable shipbuilding business.
Giovanni Costantino resigned as chairman, chief executive and director on 20 July 2026. Gianmaria Costantino also resigned as a director, while retaining his employment relationship with the company. Pietro Smeriglio stepped down the following day. Those departures meant that a majority of the directors originally appointed by shareholders were no longer in office, automatically bringing the board’s mandate to an end.
The board nevertheless continues on an interim basis. A shareholders’ meeting scheduled for 11 September is expected to approve the delayed 2025 financial statements and appoint a new board of directors and board of statutory auditors. Before that, the interim board is scheduled to consider the draft 2025 accounts on 31 July.
Costantino’s departure from executive office also does not, by itself, remove his influence as controlling shareholder. At the time of his resignation, he indirectly owned 53.604 per cent of TISG through GC Holding, representing 28.41 million shares.
The immediate crisis is therefore a separation of management and governance from the existing ownership structure, rather than a confirmed sale or transfer of control.
The company said the leadership change could strengthen stakeholder confidence and facilitate restructuring. That will depend heavily on whether the new directors are seen as sufficiently independent, whether lenders and yacht owners support the recovery plan and whether fresh capital can be obtained on acceptable terms.
The financial problem is rooted in the execution of yachts already under construction.
In February, TISG’s board acknowledged significant costs above the approved budgets on a majority of ongoing contracts. The company alleged that some senior executives had circumvented internal controls and concealed the real financial position of individual projects.
Giovanni Costantino subsequently filed a criminal complaint alleging that accounting and management documents—including budgets, cash-flow reports and bank information—had been altered. Those remain allegations, and responsibility has not been established by a court.
KPMG Advisory was appointed to examine current orders, financial management and the company’s internal-control structure. TISG confirmed on 24 July that it had received KPMG’s results and passed them to the company’s governing bodies and the competent authorities.
The company did not publish the conclusions, identify individuals or quantify how much of the reported damage may be attributable to misconduct rather than poor estimating, inflation, contract terms or ordinary project-management failure.
The emerging financial figures demonstrate the scale of the problem. Unaudited figures presented to shareholders showed a 2025 net loss of approximately €163.8 million and negative shareholders’ equity of about €382.5 million. By 30 April 2026, negative equity had reportedly increased to approximately €399.2 million.
At 31 May, TISG reported group net financial debt of approximately €178.8 million and total overdue liabilities of approximately €266.8 million, including sums owed to banks, suppliers, factoring companies, tax authorities and social-security bodies.
Those figures were unaudited and remain subject to the delayed financial-statement process.
This is why the order book cannot be judged only by its headline sales value. A full shed is valuable only when contracted payments cover design, labour, equipment, subcontracting and financing costs.
An order that was sold at an inadequate price—or whose true cost was not visible to management—can consume cash as construction progresses.
Admiral is central to any recovery because it remains TISG’s most visible large-motor-yacht brand and is connected to several substantial projects under construction.
In May, the company said the first Admiral Panorama 50 had completed sea trials, with delivery expected in early July. A second hybrid Panorama 50 was then scheduled for launch in July and delivery in September.
TISG also reported that 82-metre and 85-metre projects were in detailed design, while construction of an additional 88-metre yacht was progressing in Turkey before transfer to Italy for completion.
Those statements showed that industrial work was continuing, but they did not remove the financial risk attached to the contracts. The recovery plan specifically depends on renegotiating agreements with yacht-owning companies in an attempt to recover some of the extra expenditure incurred on individual builds.
For owners, reopening a yacht contract during construction is sensitive. They may be asked to accept a higher price, alter the specification, delay delivery or change the payment schedule.
Owners may resist if they believe the yard should bear the consequences of its original estimate, particularly where a fixed-price contract was intended to transfer cost risk to the builder.
Admiral therefore represents both the strongest route to preserving TISG as an operating shipyard and one of its largest sources of execution risk.
The brand’s future will depend less on its design reputation than on whether projects can be completed without generating further losses.
If the new board can agree sustainable terms with owners, restore predictable production and deliver the current Admiral yachts, the brand could emerge largely intact. If negotiations fail, contract cancellations, guarantee claims and legal disputes could damage both the order book and future sales.
TISG first entered a negotiated crisis-settlement process in March. When out-of-court negotiations became insufficient, it moved in July to a court-backed procedure under Italy’s Crisis and Insolvency Code. The Florence court granted the company time to prepare a final plan and appointed three judicial commissioners.
The court subsequently confirmed protective measures for four months from 1 July. During that period, shipowners are generally prevented from terminating existing contracts because of shipyard defaults or enforcing guarantees, while certain suppliers essential to near-delivery projects receive temporary protection from factoring obligations.
These protections are intended to stop a disorderly collapse in which multiple owners cancel simultaneously, banks pay out guarantees and suppliers withdraw from projects. They create a period in which the company can negotiate a broader settlement.
They do not guarantee that the contracts will survive once the protection expires. A yacht owner who has lost confidence may still seek termination when legally permitted.
Suppliers may refuse to resume work without payment arrangements, while banks and guarantors will require evidence that the revised business plan is credible.
The company has suggested that a capital increase of approximately €100 million could be considered from the fourth quarter, subject to agreements with owners, suppliers and financial institutions.
The feasibility of raising that money will depend on the new governance structure, the final financial statements and the value investors assign to the remaining brands and facilities.
Perini Navi’s position is more complicated because its difficulties combine the group’s financial crisis with the continuing consequences of the loss of Bayesian.
Bayesian was built and delivered by the former Perini Navi organisation in 2008. TISG did not acquire Perini Navi’s assets until the end of 2021, when it bought the business from bankruptcy proceedings for €80 million.
The present group owns the brand and archive, but the yacht pre-dated that acquisition by more than a decade.
The yacht sank off Sicily in August 2024 with the loss of seven lives. The UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch’s interim report identified stability and wind-related vulnerabilities requiring further examination, while stressing that the investigation remained ongoing and that it had deliberately excluded information it could not verify.
Italian criminal investigations have proceeded separately.
TISG has maintained that the yacht was safe and has attributed the loss to operational failures. It has also brought a reported €456 million civil claim against the owning company and members of the crew, alleging that the sinking caused severe reputational and commercial damage.
The claim is contested, and liability for the casualty has not been finally determined.
According to the Financial Times, the company has said that Perini Navi has not sold a new yacht since the sinking. That makes the brand’s recovery different from Admiral’s.
Admiral’s challenge is largely the profitable completion of existing work; Perini Navi must also restore confidence among owners considering new large sailing-yacht commissions.
The brand still has historical value, a recognised fleet and an extensive design archive. Yet a future owner or investor would need to decide how much capital and time should be committed to rebuilding its new-yacht pipeline while the Bayesian investigations and litigation remain unresolved.
TISG’s restructuring may ultimately change the physical shape of the group.
On 24 July, the company confirmed that it was evaluating the enhancement or possible disposal of its La Spezia shipyard. Discussions were taking place with potential buyers through financial adviser Meti Corporate Finance, although no binding agreement or exclusive negotiation had been entered into.
Any sale would require approval from the judicial authority supervising the restructuring.
The possible disposal is significant because the recovery plan had already identified property revaluation and the sale of non-core real estate as possible sources of value.
A shipyard, however, is not simply surplus property. Its docks, sheds, permits, workforce and waterfront access may be essential to a brand’s capacity to build or refit yachts.
A sale-and-leaseback arrangement, transfer to another marine group or outright disposal could generate liquidity while preserving some operations. Alternatively, selling a facility could lead to a reduction in internal capacity and greater dependence on subcontracted construction elsewhere.
The outcome will help indicate whether the restructuring is intended to preserve TISG substantially in its present form or produce a smaller group focused on selected brands and activities.
Admiral, Tecnomar, Perini Navi and Picchiotti have identities that extend beyond the present corporate crisis. NCA Refit, Celi 1920 and the group’s partnerships with Lamborghini and Giorgio Armani add further specialised capabilities and commercial relationships.
That creates several possible outcomes.
A successful recapitalisation could preserve the group under new management, with owners accepting revised contracts and suppliers returning to normal terms.
A more selective restructuring could retain Admiral and the most advanced projects while selling property or secondary businesses. A strategic investor might acquire control of the whole group, while a less orderly process could eventually separate individual brands, facilities and order-book projects.
What should not be assumed is that the disappearance of the existing board automatically means the disappearance of the yachts or brands.
Shipbuilding assets can continue under different ownership, and large projects may be transferred, refinanced or completed through specially negotiated arrangements.
The more immediate danger is delay. Custom yachts contain thousands of components, specialised subcontractors and technical decisions that depend on continuity.
Experienced employees may leave, suppliers may prioritise better-funded customers and unfinished work can deteriorate if production repeatedly stops and restarts.
Preserving the knowledge inside the workforce may therefore be as important as preserving the brand names.
The replacement directors expected to be appointed in September will inherit a company whose main strategic choices are already constrained.
They must complete and approve reliable financial statements, respond to the KPMG findings, present a credible court-backed restructuring plan, negotiate with yacht owners, secure supplier cooperation and determine whether asset disposals or a capital increase can provide sufficient liquidity.
They must also manage active litigation and continuing scrutiny surrounding Bayesian without prejudging investigations still in progress.
For Admiral, the test will be whether the existing motor-yacht programme can be delivered profitably and whether owners continue placing new orders.
For Perini Navi, the challenge is more fundamental: restoring confidence in a celebrated sailing-yacht name while legal, technical and reputational questions remain open.
For the wider group, the decisive asset is not merely its collection of brands. It is the ability to convince owners that signing a contract today will result in a completed yacht years later.
The Italian Sea Group still has shipbuilding infrastructure, recognised names and major yachts under construction. What it no longer has is the freedom to treat those assets as proof of financial strength by themselves.
Its future will now depend on whether new governance can convert them into a credible, funded and transparent operating business.
Financial Times: The Italian Sea Group leadership and restructuring
The Italian Sea Group: director resignations
The Italian Sea Group: revised 2026 financial calendar
The Italian Sea Group: KPMG findings and La Spezia discussions
The Italian Sea Group: shareholders’ meeting financial information
The Italian Sea Group: May 2026 market financial disclosure